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Abstract—Identifying potentially vulnerable locations in a code
base is critical as a pre-step for effective vulnerability assessment;
i.e., it can greatly help security experts put their time and effort to
where it is needed most. Metric-based and pattern-based methods
have been presented for identifying vulnerable code. The former
relies on machine learning and cannot work well due to the severe
imbalance between non-vulnerable and vulnerable code or lack of
features to characterize vulnerabilities. The latter needs the prior
knowledge of known vulnerabilities and can only identify similar
but not new types of vulnerabilities.
In this paper, we propose and implement a generic, lightweight
and extensible framework, LEOPARD, to identify potentially vul-
nerable functions through program metrics. LEOPARD requires
no prior knowledge about known vulnerabilities. It has two steps
by combining two sets of systematically derived metrics. First, it
uses complexity metrics to group the functions in a target applica-
tion into a set of bins. Then, it uses vulnerability metrics to rank
the functions in each bin and identifies the top ones as potentially
vulnerable. Our experimental results on 11 real-world projects
have demonstrated that, LEOPARD can cover 74.0% of vulnerable
functions by identifying 20% of functions as vulnerable and out-
perform machine learning-based and static analysis-based tech-
niques. We further propose three applications of LEOPARD for
manual code review and fuzzing, through which we discovered 22
new bugs in real applications like PHP, radare2 and FFmpeg,
and eight of them are new vulnerabilities.
Index Terms—Program Metric, Vulnerability, Fuzzing
I. INTRODUCTION
Vulnerabilities are one of the key threats to software security
[42]. Security experts usually leverage guided fuzzing (e.g., [14,
50, 66, 67]), symbolic execution (e.g., [12, 17, 27, 60]) or man-
ual auditing to hunt vulnerabilities. As only a few vulnerabilities
are scattered across a large code base, vulnerability hunting is a
very challenging task that requires intensive knowledge and is
comparable to finding “a needle in a haystack” [81]. Therefore,
a large amount of time and effort is wasted in analyzing
the non-vulnerable code. In that sense, identifying potentially
vulnerable code in a code base can guide vulnerability hunting
and assessment in a promising direction.
There are two types of existing techniques to automatically
identify vulnerabilities: metric-based and pattern-based tech-
niques. Metric-based techniques, inspired by bug prediction
[16, 28, 30, 38, 46, 49, 78], leverage supervised or unsupervised
machine learning to predict vulnerable code mostly at the gran-
ularity level of a source file. Following security experts’ belief
that complexity is the enemy of software security [40], they use
complexity metrics [21, 44, 45, 55, 56] as features, or combine
them with code churn metrics [26, 54, 58], token frequency
metrics [31, 52, 65, 79], dependency metrics [43, 47, 48, 81],
developer activity metrics [54, 58] and execution complexity
metrics [57]. On the other hand, pattern-based techniques
leverage patterns of known vulnerabilities to identify potentially
vulnerable code through static analysis. The patterns are for-
mulated based on the syntax or semantics abstraction of a
certain type of vulnerabilities, e.g., missing security checks on
security-critical objects [59, 74], security properties [63], code
structures [72], and vulnerability specifications [37, 71].
While vulnerability identification has been attracting great
attention, some problems still remain. On one hand, metric-
based techniques are mostly designed for one single application
(or a few applications of the same type). Thus, they might not
work on a variety of diverse applications as machine learning
may over-fit to noise features. Moreover, while an empirical
connection between vulnerabilities and bugs exist, the con-
nection is considerably weak due to the differences between
vulnerabilities and bugs [15]. As a result, the research on
bug prediction cannot directly translate to vulnerability iden-
tification. Unfortunately, the existing metric-based techniques
use the similar metrics as those in bug prediction, and thus
fail to investigate the characteristics of vulnerabilities.
On the other hand, metric-based and pattern-based techniques
mostly require a great deal of prior knowledge about vulnera-
bilities. In particular, a large number of known vulnerabilities
are needed for effective supervised machine learning in some
metric-based techniques. The number of vulnerabilities is much
smaller than the number of bugs, and the imbalance between
non-vulnerable and vulnerable code is severe, which hinders
the applicability of supervised machine learning to vulnerable
code identification. Similarly, a prerequisite of those pattern-
based techniques is the existence of known vulnerabilities as
the guideline to formulate patterns. They can only identify sim-
ilar but not new vulnerabilities. Further, patterns are often
application-specific, and thus those techniques are usually used
as in-project but not cross-project vulnerable code identification.
In this paper, we propose a vulnerability identification frame-
work, named LEOPARD1, to identify potentially vulnerable
1Leopard is known for its opportunistic hunting behavior, broad diet, and
strength, which reflect the identification capabilities we are pursuing.
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functions in C/C++ applications. LEOPARD is designed to be
generic to work for different types of applications, lightweight
to support the analysis of large-scale applications and extensible
with domain-specific data to improve the accuracy. We design
LEOPARD as a pre-step for vulnerability assessment, but not
to directly pinpoint vulnerabilities. We propose three different
applications of LEOPARD to guide security experts during the
manual auditing or automatic fuzzing by narrowing down the
space of potentially vulnerable functions.
LEOPARD does not require any prior knowledge about known
vulnerabilities. It works in two steps by combining two sets of
systematically derived program metrics, i.e., complexity metrics
and vulnerability metrics. Complexity metrics capture the com-
plexity of a function in two complementary dimensions: the
cyclomatic complexity of the function, and the loop structures
in the function. Vulnerability metrics reflect the vulnerable char-
acteristics of functions in three dimensions: the dependency of
the function, pointer usage in the function, and the dependency
among control structures within the function.
LEOPARD first uses complexity metrics to group the func-
tions in a target application into a set of bins. Then, LEOPARD
leverages vulnerability metrics to rank the functions in each
bin and identify the top functions in each bin as potentially
vulnerable. We propose such a binning-and-ranking approach
as there often exists a proportional relation between complexity
and vulnerability metrics, which is evidenced in our experi-
mental study. As a result, each bin has a different level of
complexity, and our framework can identify vulnerabilities at
all levels of complexity without missing low-complexity ones.
We implemented the proposed framework to obtain complex-
ity and vulnerability metrics for C/C++ programs. We evaluated
the effectiveness and scalability of our framework with 11
different types of real-world projects. LEOPARD can cover
74.0% of vulnerable functions by identifying 20% of functions
as potentially vulnerable, outperforming both typical machine
learning-based and static analysis-based techniques. Applying
LEOPARD on PHP, MJS, XED, FFmpeg and Radare2 and
with further manual auditing or automatic fuzzing, we discov-
ered 22 new bugs, among which eight are new vulnerabilities.
In summary, our work makes the following contributions.
• We propose a generic, lightweight and extensible framework
to identify potentially vulnerable functions, which incorpo-
rates two sets of program metrics.
• We propose three different applications of LEOPARD to guide
security experts during the manual auditing or automatic
fuzzing to hunt for vulnerabilities.
• We implemented our framework and conducted large-scale
experiments on 11 real-world projects to demonstrate the ef-
fectiveness and scalability of our framework.
• We demonstrated three application scenarios of our frame-
work and found 22 new bugs.
II. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we present the overview of LEOPARD and
elaborate each step of the proposed approach.
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Fig. 1: An Overview of the Proposed Framework
A. Overview
Fig. 1 presents the work flow of LEOPARD, which is designed
to be generic, lightweight and extensible. The input is the source
code of a C/C++ application. LEOPARD works in two steps:
function binning and function ranking, and returns a list of po-
tentially vulnerable functions for vulnerability assessment.
In the first step (§ II-B), we use complexity metrics to group
all functions in the target application into a set of bins. The
complexity metrics capture the complexity of a function in two
dimensions: the function itself (i.e., cyclomatic complexity) and
the loop structures in the function (e.g., the number of nested
loops). Each bin has a different level of complexity, which is
designed to identify vulnerabilities at all levels of complexity
(i.e., avoid missing vulnerable functions with low-complexity).
In the second step (§ II-C), we use vulnerability metrics
to rank the functions in each bin in order to identify the top
functions in each bin as potentially vulnerable. The vulnerabil-
ity metrics capture the vulnerable characteristics of a function
in three dimensions: the dependency of the function (e.g., the
number of parameters), the pointer usage in a function (e.g., the
number of pointer arithmetic) and the dependency of control
structures in the function (e.g., the number of nested control
structures). By incorporating such metrics, we can have a high
potential of characterizing and identifying vulnerable functions.
LEOPARD is designed to support and facilitate confirmative
vulnerability assessments, e.g., to guide security experts dur-
ing automatic fuzzing [14, 50, 66, 67] or manual auditing
by providing potentially vulnerable function list and the
corresponding metrics information. With such knowledge,
security experts can prioritize the assessment order, choose the
appropriate analysis technique, and analyze the root cause.
Further, based on application-specific domain knowledge (e.g.,
vulnerability history and heavily fuzzed function lists), security
experts can further rank or filter the potentially vulnerable
functions to focus on those more interesting functions.
Using program metrics in a simple binning-and-ranking way
makes LEOPARD satisfy our design principle of being generic
and lightweight. It is applicable to any large-scale applications
of any type and does not require prior knowledge about known
vulnerabilities. The two sets of metrics are comprehensive, but
also are extensible with new metrics as we gather more usage
feedback from security experts (see discussion in § V). Thus,
LEOPARD also satisfies our design principle of being extensible
such that it can be further enhanced.
B. Function Binning
Different vulnerabilities often have different levels of com-
plexity. To identify vulnerabilities at all levels of complexity, in
the first step, we categorize all functions in the target application
TABLE I: Complexity Metrics of a Function
Dimension ID Metric Description
CD1: Function C1 Cyclomatic complexity
CD2: Loop Structures
C2 # of loops
C3 # of nested loops
C4 Maximum nesting level of loops
into a set of bins based on complexity metrics. As a result, each
bin represents a different level of complexity. Afterwards, the
second step (§ II-C) plays the prediction role via ranking. Such
a binning-and-ranking approach is designed to avoid missing
low-complexity vulnerable functions.
Complexity Metrics. By “complexity”, we refer to the approx-
imate number of paths in a function, and derive the complexity
metrics of a function from its structural complexity. A function
often has loop and control structures, which are the main
sources of structural complexity. Cyclomatic complexity [39]
is a widely-used metric to measure the complexity, but without
reflection of the loop structures. Based on such understanding,
we introduce the complexity of a function with respect to these
two complementary dimensions, as shown in Table I.
Function metric (C1) captures the standard cyclomatic
complexity [39] of a function, i.e., the number of linearly
independent paths through a function. A higher value of C1
means that the function is likely more difficult to analyze or test.
Loop structure metrics (C2–C4) reflect the complexity
resulting from loops, which can drastically increase the number
of paths in the function. Metrics include the number of loops,
the number of nested loops, and the maximum nesting level
of loops. Loops are challenging in program analysis [68] and
hinder vulnerability analysis. Basically, the higher these metrics,
the more (and possibly longer) paths need to be considered
and the more difficult to analyze the function.
Binning Strategy. Given the values of these complexity metrics
for functions in the target application, we compute a complexity
score for each function by adding up all the complexity metric
values, and then group the functions with the same score into
the same bin. Here we do not use a range-based binning strategy
(i.e., grouping the functions whose scores fall into the same
range into the same bin) as it is hard to determine the suitable
granularity of the range. Such a simple strategy not only makes
our framework lightweight, but also works well, as evidenced
by our experimental study in § IV-C.
C. Function Ranking
Different from the structural complexity metrics, in the
second step, we derive a new set of vulnerability metrics accord-
ing to the characteristics of general causes of vulnerabilities,
and then rank the functions and identify the top ones in each
bin as potentially vulnerable based on the vulnerability metrics.
Existing metric-based techniques [44, 45] rarely employ any
vulnerability-oriented metrics, and make no differentiation
between complexity metrics and vulnerability metrics. Here,
we propose and incorporate vulnerability metrics to have a high
potential of characterizing and identifying vulnerable functions.
Vulnerability Metrics. Most critical types of vulnerabilities in
C/C++ programs are directly or indirectly caused by memory
management errors [61] and/or missing checks on some
TABLE II: Vulnerability Metrics of a Function
Dimension ID Metric Description
VD1:
Dependency
V1 # of parameter variables
V2 # of variables as parameters for callee function
VD2:
Pointers
V3 # of pointer arithmetic
V4 # of variables involved in pointer arithmetic
V5 Max pointer arithmetic a variable is involved in
VD3:
Control
Structures
V6 # of nested control structures
V7 Maximum nesting level of control structures
V8 Maximum of control-dependent control structures
V9 Maximum of data-dependent control structures
V10 # of if structures without else
V11 # of variables involved in control predicates
sensitive variables [74] (e.g., pointers). Resulting vulnerabilities
include but are not limited to memory errors, access control er-
rors (e.g., missing checks on user permission), and information
leakage. Actually, the root causes of many denial of service
and code execution vulnerabilities can also be traced back to
these causes. The above mentioned types account for more
than 70% of all vulnerabilities [11]. Hence, it is possible to
define a set of vulnerability metrics that are compatible with
major vulnerability types. Here we would not favor any specific
types of vulnerabilities, e.g., to include metrics like division
operation which is closely related to divide-by-zero, while the
exploration of type-specific metrics is worth of investigation
in the future. With either high or low complexity scores,
vulnerable functions we focus on are mainly with complicated
and compact computations, which are independent from the
number of paths in the function. Based on these observations,
we introduce the vulnerability metrics of a function w.r.t. three
dimensions, as summarized in Table II.
Dependency metrics (V1–V2) characterize the dependency
relationship of a function with other functions, i.e., the number
of parameter variables of the function and the number of
variables prepared by the function as parameters of function
calls. The more dependent with other functions, the more
difficult to track the interaction.
Pointer metrics (V3–V5) capture the manipulation of
pointers, i.e., the number of pointer arithmetic, the number of
variables used in pointer arithmetic, and the maximum number
of pointer arithmetic a variable is involved in. Member access
operations (e.g., ptr→m), deference operations (e.g., *ptr),
incrementing pointers (e.g., ptr++), and decrementing pointers
(e.g., prt--) are all pointer arithmetics. The number of pointer
arithmetic can be obtained from the Abstract Syntax Tree
(AST) of the function via simple counting. These operations
are closely related to sensitive memory manipulations, which
can increase the risk of memory management errors.
Alongside, we count how many unique variables are used
in the pointer arithmetic operations. The more variables get
involved, the more challenging for programmers to make correct
decisions. For these variables, we also examine how many
pointer arithmetic operations they are involved in and record
the maximum value. Frequent operations on the same pointer
make it harder to track its value and guarantee the correctness.
In a word, the higher these metrics, the higher chance to cause
complicated memory management problems, and thus higher
chance to dereference null or out-of-bound pointers.
Control structure metrics (V6–V11) capture the vulnerabil-
1 vo id f i b o n a c c i ( i n t ∗r e s , i n t n ) {
2 i f ( n <= 0) {
3 r e t u r n ;
4 }
5 r e s [ 0 ] = 0 ;
6 r e s [ 1 ] = 1 ;
7 i f ( n > 1) {
8 i f ( n == 3) {
9 r e s [ 2 ] = 1 ;
10 r e t u r n ;
11 }
12 f o r ( i n t i = 2 ; i <= n ; i ++) {
13 r e s [ i ] = r e s [ i−1] + r e s [ i−2];
14 }
15 }
16 }
Fig. 2: A Function to Calculate Fibonacci Series
ity due to highly coupled and dependent control structures (such
as if and while), i.e., the number of nested control structures
pairs, the maximum nesting level of control structures, the
maximum number of control structures that are control- or
data-dependent, the number of if structures without explicit
else statement, and the number of variables that are involved
in the data-dependent control structures. We explain the above
metrics with an example (Fig. 2) calculating Fibonacci series.
There are two pairs of nested control structures, if at Line 7
respectively with if at Line 8 and for at Line 12. Obviously,
the maximum nesting level is two, with the outer structure
as if at Line 7. The maximum of control-dependent control
structures is 3, including if at Line 7 and Line 8, and for at
Line 12. The maximum of data-dependent control structures is
four since conditions in all four control structures make checks
on variable n. All three if statements are without else. There are
two variables, i.e., n and i involved in the predicates of control
structures. Actually, the more variables used in the predicates,
the more likely to makes error on sanity checks. The higher
these metrics, the harder for programmers to follow, and the
more difficult to reach the deeper part of the function during
vulnerability hunting. Stand-alone if structures are suspicious
for missing checks on the implicit else branches.
There usually exists a proportional relation between com-
plexity and vulnerability metrics, because the more complex the
(independent path and loop) structures of a function, the higher
chance the variables, pointers and coupled control structures
are involved. The complexity metrics are used to approximate
the number of paths in the function, which are neutral to the
vulnerable characteristics. Importantly, for the set of control
structure metrics used as vulnerability indicators, they describe
a different aspect of properties than complexity metrics. First,
whether control structures are nested or dependent, or whether if
are followed by else, are independent to cyclomatic complexity
metrics. Second, intensively coupled control structures are good
evidence of vulnerability. Instead of directly ranking functions
with complexity and/or vulnerability metrics, we propose a
binning-and-ranking approach to avoid missing less compli-
cated but vulnerable functions, as will be evidenced in § IV-B.
Ranking Strategy. Based on the values of these metrics for the
functions, we compute a vulnerability score for each function
by adding up all the metric values, rank the functions in each
bin according to the scores, and cumulatively identify the
top functions with highest scores in each bin as potential
vulnerable functions. During the selection, we identify the top
k functions from each bin where k is initially 1, and increase
by 1 in each selection iteration. Notice that we may take more
than k functions as we treat functions with the same score
equally. This selection stops when an appropriate portion (i.e.,
p) of functions has been selected. Here p can be set by users.
Similar to the binning strategy, we adopt a simple ranking
strategy to make our framework both lightweight and effective.
III. APPLICATIONS OF LEOPARD
LEOPARD is not designed to directly pinpoint vulnerabilities
but to assist confirmative vulnerability assessment. LEOPARD
outputs a list of potential vulnerable functions with complexity
metrics and vulnerability metrics scores, which can provide
useful insight for further vulnerability hunting. In this section,
we demonstrate three different ways to apply the results gener-
ated by LEOPARD for finding vulnerabilities. With LEOPARD,
we found 22 new bugs in five widely-used real-world programs.
The detailed experimental results will be introduced in § IV-F.
Manual Auditing. In general, with the help of LEOPARD,
manual auditing (e.g., code review) can be greatly improved
w.r.t. effectiveness and efficiency. Instead of auditing all the
functions [22], security experts can focus on only those
potentially vulnerable functions that are identified by LEOPARD.
Furthermore, the vulnerability metrics produced by LEOP-
ARD may help security experts to quickly identify the root
cause of vulnerabilities with their domain knowledge, especially
for complicated large functions. For example, if a vulnerable
function has a large number of instances of if-without-else,
security experts could pay attention to the logic of the missing
else to see if there are potential missing checks; and if a
vulnerable function has a large number of pointers, security
experts could focus on the memory allocation and deallocation
operations to see if there are potential dangling pointers.
Although these metrics cannot directly pinpoint the root cause,
it can provide explicit hints on the possible root cause.
Target Identification for Directed Fuzzing. Fuzzing has been
shown as an effective testing technique to find vulnerabilities.
Specifically, greybox fuzzers (e.g., AFL [4] and its variants
[13, 14]) have gained the popularity and been proven to be
practical for finding vulnerabilities in real-world applications.
Current greybox fuzzers aim to cover as many program
states as possible within a given time budget. However,
higher coverage does not necessarily imply finding more
vulnerabilities because fuzzers are blindly exploring all possible
program states without focusing the efforts on the more
vulnerable functions. Recently, directed greybox fuzzers (e.g.,
AFLGo [13] and Hawkeye [20]) are proposed to guide the
fuzzing execution towards a predefined vulnerable function
(a.k.a. target site) to either reproduce the vulnerability or check
whether a patched function is still vulnerable [13].
Since LEOPARD produces a list potential vulnerable func-
tions, a straightforward application with directed greybox
fuzzers is to set potential vulnerable functions as target sites.
In this way, we can quickly confirm whether a potentially
vulnerable function is really vulnerable or a false positive
by directing the fuzzer to concentrate on the function. Note
that although the fuzzer can reach a vulnerable function, the
vulnerability hidden in the function may not always be triggered.
But still, directed fuzzing has been shown as an effective
technique to reproduce vulnerabilities [13]. To demonstrate the
idea, we utilize a directed fuzzing tool, Hawkeye [20], which
is built upon an extensible fuzzing framework FOT [19] and
reported to outperform ALFGo [13]. However, due to the
large number of the potential vulnerable functions generated
by LEOPARD, it is ineffective to set all potential vulnerable
functions as target sites as it may confuse the fuzzer where to
guide. To this end, we choose to separate the target application
into smaller modules based on its architecture design or simply
namespace, and then let the Hawkeye to fuzz with the targets
grouped by modules separately.
Seed Prioritization for Fuzzing. Greybox fuzzers often keep
interesting test inputs (i.e., seeds) for further fuzzing. These
seeds need to be continuously evaluated to decide which of
them should be prioritized. By default, most fuzzers (e.g., AFL)
prefer seeds with “smaller file size” and “shorter execution
time” or “more edge (basic-block transition) coverage”, which
are not vulnerability-aware decisions.
Since LEOPARD assigns each function a vulnerability score
and a complexity score, we can use these scores to help to
evaluate which seed should be prioritized such that the fuzzer
can find more vulnerabilities in the given time budget. For this
purpose, we extended FOT by enabling it to accept external
function-level scores for seed prioritization. The detailed seed
evaluation process is explained as follows. First, we calculate
a priority score for each function based on the binning-and-
ranking strategy. For a function F within top k, its priority
score is calculated using the following formula:
priority score(F) = 100−
∑k
i=1Ni
N · 100
(1)
where Ni is the number of functions with rank i and N is
the total number of all functions. For example, if the top 1
functions contribute a portion of 20% to the total number of
all functions, then these functions are assigned with a score of
80 (100−20). Then, the function-score mapping is provided to
FOT . After executing a test input (i.e., seed), the fuzzer can get
an execution trace consist of functions. Then the fuzzer will
accumulate the priority scores of the functions on the execution
trace to form the priority score of that trace. As a result, each
seed is associated with a trace priority score representing its
vulnerableness. When the fuzzer chooses the next seed to fuzz,
it will select the one with highest trace priority score.
IV. EVALUATION
LEOPARD is implemented in 11K lines of Python code.
Specifically, we used Joern [71] to extract the values of
complexity and vulnerability metrics, given the source code
of an application. More details of the implementation and
evaluation are available at our website [6].
A. Evaluation Setup
Target Applications. We used 11 real-world open-source
projects that represent a diverse set of applications. BIND is
TABLE III: Details of the Target Applications
Project SLOC #Func. Vul.Func. CVE
Excl.
CVE
BIND 9.11.0 504K 9,462 9 3 3
Binutils 2.28 3,336K 24,713 84 37 24
FFmpeg 3.1.3 986K 19,336 38 26 6
FreeType 2.3.9 126K 1,847 74 48 18
Libav 11.8 583k 10,583 8 6 8
LibTIFF 4.0.6 118K 1,394 20 12 24
libxslt 1.1.28 47K 666 5 3 1
Linux 4.12.8 17,103K 488,960 256 104 32
OpenSSL 1.0.1t 360K 6,649 42 17 3
SQLite 3.8.2 172K 3,651 10 7 2
Wireshark 2.2.0 3,551K 33,564 152 74 31
Total 26,886K 600,825 698 337 152
the most widely used Domain Name System (DNS) software.
Binutils is a collection of binary tools. FFmpeg is the
leading multimedia framework. FreeType is a library to
render fonts. Libav is a library for handling multimedia data,
which was originally forked from FFmpeg. LibTIFF is a
library for reading and writing Tagged Image File Format
(TIFF) files. libxslt is the XSLT C library for the GNOME
project. Linux is a monolithic Unix-like computer operating
system kernel. OpenSSL is a robust and full-featured toolkit for
the Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) protocols. SQLite is a relational database management
system. Wireshark is a network traffic analyzer for Unix
and Unix-like operating systems.
The details of each target application are reported in Table III.
The first column gives the project version, the second column
reports the source lines of code, and the third column lists
the total number of functions in each project. The last three
columns report the number of vulnerable functions, CVEs2
(Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), and CVEs excluded
from our research, collected as ground truth (see below). Here,
we chose the recent versions of the projects that had large
number of CVEs. The number of functions ranges from 666
for libxslt to 488,960 for Linux, which is diverse enough
to show the generality of our framework. In total, 26,886K
lines of code and 600,825 functions are studied, which makes
our study large-scale and its results reliable.
Ground Truth. To obtain the ground truth for evaluating the
effectiveness of LEOPARD, we first manually identified the list
of vulnerabilities that were disclosed before July 2018 in the
11 projects from two vulnerability database websites: CVE
Details [11] and National Vulnerability Database [7], i.e., we
collected all the vulnerabilities reported for the given version of
the project from its release date to July 2018. CVEs in external
libraries used in a project are not claimed to the project.
The full list of CVEs in most projects are recorded by the
above two websites. However, the patches of the CVEs are not
well maintained and difficult to collect. We obtained available
patches of these CVEs in the 11 projects from an industrial
collaborator, who offers vulnerability scanning services for
C/C++ programs. Functions that are patched to fix the vulner-
ability are identified as vulnerable. The results are reported
2CVE is a unique ID of a publicly known vulnerability. Usually, when a
vulnerability is reported and confirmed, a CVE ID is assigned. For open-source
projects, the details (e.g., id, cause, and affected versions) about the CVE will
become publicly available once it has been fixed.
(a) Binutils 2.28 (b) FFmpeg 3.1.3 (c) FreeType 2.3.9 (d) Libav 11.8 (e) LibTIFF 4.0.6
(f) libxslt 1.1.28 (g) Linux 4.12.8 (h) OpenSSL 1.0.1t (i) SQLite 3.8.2 (j) Wireshark 2.2.0
Fig. 3: Vulnerability Score vs. Complexity Score for Non-Vulnerable Functions (in Blue) and Vulnerable Functions (in Red)
in the fourth and fifth columns of Table III. As an example,
we display the CVE list, available patches and corresponding
patched functions of Libav at our website [6].
Some CVEs failed to be included in our research, as shown in
the last column of Table III because (i) there is no public detail
about the fix that can directly identify the affected vulnerable
functions as either the CVE affects some closed source projects
or other reasons (e.g., CVE-2015-6607 and CVE-2015-5895
for SQLite 3.8.2); (ii) the fix does not involve direct code
change on functions (e.g., CVE-2016-7958 for Wireshark
2.2.0 and CVE-2016-2183 for OpenSSL 1.0.1t).
Research Questions. We designed the experiments to answer
the following research questions:
• Q1. Is the binning step before the ranking step reasonable?
(§ IV-B)
• Q2. Is our binning-and-ranking approach effective, and can
it outperform baseline approaches, machine learning-based
techniques and some off-the-shelf static scanners? (§ IV-C)
• Q3. What is the sensitivity of the metrics to the effectiveness
of our framework? (§ IV-D)
• Q4. What is the performance overhead (i.e., scalability) of
our framework? (§ IV-E)
• Q5. What are the potential application scenarios of LEOP-
ARD? (§ IV-F)
B. Rationality of Binning before Ranking (Q1)
To answer this question, we first computed the complexity
score and vulnerability score, as in § II-B and § II-C, for each
function in all the projects (as shown in Table III). Then we
plotted in Fig. 3 the relationship between complexity score (i.e.,
x-axis) and vulnerability score (i.e., y-axis) using logarithmic
scale, where vulnerable and non-vulnerable functions were
respectively highlighted in red and blue. The result of BIND is
omitted for space limitations but is available on our website [6].
We can see from Fig. 3 that all projects share the sim-
ilar patterns; vulnerable functions are scattered across non-
vulnerable functions w.r.t. complexity score and vulnerability
score; and there exists an approximately proportional relation
between complexity score and vulnerability score for vulnerable
functions. Therefore, if we directly ranked the functions based
on complexity metrics and/or vulnerability metrics, we would
always favor those functions with high complexity score and
high vulnerability score, and miss those with low-complexity
but vulnerable (e.g., vulnerable functions located in the first
3 bins in Fig. 3a, 3g and 3j). Instead, by first binning the
functions according to complexity score and then ranking the
functions in each bin according to vulnerability score, our
framework can effectively identify the potentially vulnerable
functions at all levels of complexity (see details in § IV-C).
For all 11 projects, the number of bins ranges from 56 to
206 with an average of 114. Each bin has 301 functions on
average, and 22% of bins contain vulnerable functions. Details
of the function distribution among bins can be found at our
website [6]. As can be seen from Fig. 3, bins with smaller
complexity scores have more functions, and bins with larger
complexity scores have more vulnerable functions. Sparsity
of bins with larger complexity scores benefits the selection
of most vulnerable functions, while our ranking in bins with
smaller complexity scores gives more chance to identify less
complex but vulnerable functions. Moreover, Fig. 3 also visually
indicates the severe imbalance between non-vulnerable and
vulnerable functions (see the third and fourth columns of Table
III), which indicates traditional machine learning will over-fit
and be less effective (more details will be discussed in § IV-C).
Our binning-and-ranking approach is reasonable for pre-
dicting vulnerable functions at all levels of complexity.
C. Effectiveness of Binning-and-Ranking (Q2)
We ran LEOPARD on all the projects; and analyzed its
effectiveness when selecting different portion of functions, i.e.,
the parameter p in the ranking step (see § II-C). Here we used
the percentage of functions (i.e., Iden. Func.) that are identified
by LEOPARD as potentially vulnerable, and the percentage of
vulnerable functions (i.e., Cov. Vul. Func.) that are covered
by those identified potentially vulnerable functions as the two
indicators of the effectiveness of our framework. These two
indicators are used throughout the evaluation section.
The results are shown in Fig. 4, where the x-axis denotes
Iden. Func. and the y-axis denotes Cov. Vul. Func.. The legends
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Fig. 4: Percentage of Functions (Iden. Func.) that are Identified as Potentially Vulnerable, and Percentage of Vulnerable
Functions (Cov. Vul. Func.) that are Covered by Those Identified Potentially Vulnerable Functions
TABLE IV: Identified and Covered Vulnerable Functions
Project Iden. Func. (%)5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
BIND 9.11.0 55.6 55.6 66.7 66.7 66.7 88.9
Binutils 2.28 23.8 42.9 51.2 65.5 71.4 78.6
FFmpeg 3.1.3 42.1 55.3 65.8 68.4 78.9 89.5
FreeType 2.3.9 16.2 52.7 63.5 75.7 83.8 90.5
Libav 11.8 25.0 62.5 75.0 75.0 75.0 87.5
LibTIFF 4.0.6 0.0 35.0 65.0 80.0 90.0 90.0
libxslt 1.1.28 0.0 20.0 60.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Linux 4.12.8 24.9 38.9 48.3 59.6 64.9 70.6
OpenSSL 1.0.1t 42.9 66.7 83.3 88.1 88.1 88.1
SQLite 3.8.2 50.0 50.0 50.0 60.0 60.0 70.0
Wireshark 2.2.0 40.8 56.6 71.1 75.0 79.6 83.6
Average 29.2 48.7 63.6 74.0 78.0 85.2
are only shown in Fig. 4a and omitted in others for clarity; and
the result of BIND is omitted but available on the website [6].
In general, as Iden. Func. increases, the indicator Cov. Vul.
Func. also increases. For a small value (e.g., 20%) of Iden.
Func., our binning-and-ranking approach can achieve a high
value for Cov. Vul. Func. (e.g., 74%). Furthermore, we also
report how many vulnerable functions are covered when we
identify certain percentage of functions as vulnerable in Table
IV. When identifying 5 %, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25% and 30%
of functions as vulnerable, we can cover 29%, 49%, 64%
74%, 78% and 85% of vulnerable functions. This means by
identifying a small part of functions as vulnerable, we cover a
large portion of vulnerable functions, which can narrow down
the assessment space for security experts.
Comparison to Baseline Approaches. A recent study [80] on
42 existing cross-project defect prediction models and two
state-of-the-art unsupervised defect prediction models [46, 78]
has indicated that, simply ranking functions based on source
lines of code (SLOC) in an increasing (i.e., ManualUp) or
decreasing (i.e., ManualDown) order can achieve comparable
or even superior prediction performance compared to most
defect prediction models. We put the results of ManualUp
(which is much worse than LEOPARD) at our website [6], and
only show results of ManualDown in this section.
In Fig. 4, the comparison of Cov. Vul. Func. between LEOP-
ARD and ManualDown is shown for each project. LEOPARD
shows better results for all projects except for Binutils and
FreeType, where both approaches have similar performance.
TABLE V: Comparison of LEOPARD to Existing Approaches
Approach Iden. Func. (%)5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
LEOPARD 29.2 48.7 63.6 74.0 78.0 85.2
ManualDown 34.3 47.9 54.4 63.7 70.6 78.2
Random Forest 25.8 37.7 48.8 58.8 68.7 75.6
Gradient Boosting 22.1 39.3 54.4 60.9 67.8 73.0
On average, compared to ManualDown, 9.2%, 10.3% and 7.4%
improvement are achieved when identifying 15%, 20% and 25%
of functions as vulnerable, as shown in Table V; and we identify
15.6%, 13.8% and 11.8% less codes (measured in SLOC)
than ManualDown. On average, 96.8% of ManualDown’s true
positives are covered by LEOPARD. This demonstrates the
effectiveness of LEOPARD.
Comparison to Machine Learning-Based Techniques. We
also conducted experiments to compare our framework with
four machine learning-based techniques, namely random forest
(RF), gradient boosting (GB), naive Bayes (NB) and support
vector classification (SVC). The four techniques used all 4
complexity metrics and 11 vulnerability metrics as the features,
and conducted a cross-project prediction by first training a
model with the data from ten of the 11 projects and then
using the model to predict the probability of being vulnerable
for the functions in the other one project. By rotating the
project to predict, we obtained the prediction results for all 11
projects. A larger predicted probability indicates that a function
is more likely vulnerable. We rank the functions according to
the probabilities, and identify a list of high-probability functions
as vulnerable. A fair comparison to LEOPARD can be drawn
when the same number of functions is identified. The results
are shown in Fig. 4 and Table V.
As shown in Fig. 4, an obvious shortcoming of RF and
GB is the unstable performance among different projects. It
indicates that machine learning approaches highly depend on
the large knowledge base of various vulnerable functions,
which are however hard to obtain. Specifically, RF only shows
similar or slightly better performance than LEOPARD in Fig. 3a
and 3b, while GB only shows similar performance in Fig. 3a,
3b and 3i. LEOPARD outperforms RF and GB in Fig. 3c,
3d, 3e 3f, 3g, 3h and 3j. Both RF and GB performs even
TABLE VI: Number of Alarms and Recall of Static Scanners
Project S*** Cppcheck#Alarm Recall #Alarm Recall
BIND 9.11.0 250 0.0 45 0.0
Binutils 2.28 106 0.0 261 0.012
FFmpeg 3.1.3 42 0.0 306 0.0
FreeType 2.3.9 0 0.0 82 0.054
Libav 11.8 19 0.0 138 0.0
LibTIFF 4.0.6 76 0.1 10 0.0
libxslt 1.1.28 20 0.0 6 0.0
Linux 4.12.8 - - 3864 0.0
OpenSSL 1.0.1t 76 0.0 33 0.0
SQLite 3.8.2 20 0.0 37 0.0
Wireshark 2.2.0 0 0.0 115 0.007
worse than the ManualDown baseline in Fig. 3c, 3h and 3j.
As numerically shown in Table V, when identifying 20% of
functions, RF and GB separately cover 15.2% and 13.1% less
of ground truth than LEOPARD. Again, LEOPARD does not
rely on any prior knowledge about a large set of vulnerabilities
but machine learning-based techniques do. NB and SVC
presented extremely lower recalls among the four typical
machine learning algorithms. Hence, we omitted the results
and put them at our website [6]. Note that 11 projects may not
be an adequate dataset for training and testing, especially given
the severe imbalance between vulnerable and non-vulnerable
functions, the validity of conclusions drawn can be threatened.
However, such a prerequisite for prior knowledge of vulnerable
functions motivate our design of LEOPARD.
Comparison to Static Scanners. We also applied two popular
static software scanner tools to investigate their vulnerability
prediction capability on our dataset, including an open source
tool, Cppcheck [10], and a commercial tool. To avoid legal
disputes, we hide the name of the commercial one and refer it
as S***. Cppcheck and S*** are among the most popular static
code analysis tools used to detect bugs and vulnerabilities in
software. Both tools report the suspicious vulnerable statements.
Whenever an alarm locates within the vulnerable functions
in our ground truth, we claim a true positive for that tool.
The number of total alarms reported by these two tools and
the recall can be found in Table VI. Cppcheck was able to
analyze all 11 projects and identified a few vulnerable functions
in Binutils, FreeType and Wireshark. S*** failed to
analyze Linux; and for the other 10 projects only a few
vulnerable functions are detected in LibTIFF. Static scanners
often rely on very concrete vulnerability patterns. Subtle pattern
mismatch will cause false positives and negatives. Thus. their
recalls are nearly 0, which indicate that they are not promising
for general vulnerability identification.
False Negative Analysis. By examining the vulnerable func-
tions that LEOPARD fails to cover when 40% functions are
identified, we summarize three main reasons for false negatives:
1) they are involved in some logical vulnerabilities which are
hard to be revealed by function metrics; 2) they are implicated
via some fixes indirectly related to the CVE, e.g., if a fix
changes the function signature, callers of this function should
not be counted as vulnerable; or 3) security critical information
is in their surrounding context and unseen from the function
itself, e.g., calculation of complicated pointer offsets sometime
is done via a separate function, where no pointer metrics can
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Fig. 5: Sensitivity Analysis Results of Metrics
be inferred, thus resulting in a lower vulnerability score. For
the first case, such vulnerabilities are generally hard to identify
via static analysis, and should not be a concern of our approach.
Case two is also irrelevant to the validity of our approach. A
mitigation for the third case is to include taint information to
our vulnerability metrics, as will be discussed in §V.
False Positive Analysis. Balancing the generality, accuracy and
scalability is always a very challenging task for static analysis.
Since LEOPARD is designed to reveal general vulnerabilities, it
is impossible to avoid false positives. However, LEOPARD aims
to assist vulnerability assessment rather than a stand alone static
analysis tool. False analysis is therefore not a critical criteria for
evaluating its capability. Furthermore, some vulnerabilities are
previously patched in history, secretly patched [70] or currently
unexposed, and it is impossible to confirm whether they are
indeed false positives. This is also reflected in the experiments
in § IV-F, where new vulnerabilities have been found in the
reported potential vulnerable functions.
Our binning-and-ranking approach is effective, i.e., iden-
tifying 20% of functions as vulnerable to cover 74.0%
of vulnerable functions on average. Such a small portion
of functions can be very useful for security experts, as
will be shown in our application of LEOPARD in § IV-F.
Besides, LEOPARD outperforms machine learning-based
techniques and static analysis-based approaches.
D. Sensitivity of the Metrics (Q3)
To evaluate the sensitivity of the complexity and vulner-
ability metrics to our framework, we removed one of the
dimensions of the complexity and vulnerability metrics from
LEOPARD, and then ran LEOPARD on all the projects. We show
the sensitivity results of complexity metrics and vulnerability
metrics in Fig. 5. The x-axis and y-axis represent Iden. Func.
and the delta of recall (i.e., Cov. Vul. Func.) compared to
LEOPARD with all metrics. After removing one dimension
of metrics, the recall delta of each project when identifying
certain percentage of functions are labeled by blue cross marks,
where positive delta means improvement in performance, and
negative ones means degradation. The red dots are average
recall delta among all 11 projects.
We can see from Fig. 5 that, basically, there are much more
degradation than improvement when removing any dimension
of metrics. Moreover, the average recall deltas across projects
are negative for Iden. Func. at 15%, 20%, 25%, and 30%
in all five experiments, i.e., less vulnerable functions are
covered when the same percentage of functions is identified as
vulnerable. Some improvement of average recall delta at 5% and
10% actually results from some relatively large improvements of
only a few projects. Specifically, most significant degradation
occurs when the cyclomatic complexity metrics (i.e., CD1)
is removed, and most significant average degradation occurs
when the loop structure metrics are removed, which indicates
they make substantial contribution to our framework. It
also proves the necessity of our binning strategy. With the
above observation, we can conclude that all dimensions of
our complexity and vulnerability metrics contribute to the
effectiveness of LEOPARD, but complexity metrics contribute
the most; and it is difficult or even impossible to derive an
optimal model for the metric combination that can work well
for all ranges of Iden. Func. for all projects. Hence, we design
a generic but not optimal model that treats each metric equally.
Complexity metrics significantly contribute to LEOPARD;
and it is difficult to derive an optimal metric model that
works for all projects, which motivates our generic model
without sacrificing much effectiveness.
E. Scalability of Our Framework (Q4)
To evaluate the scalability of our framework, we col-
lected the time of extracting complexity and vulnerability
metrics and the time of identifying potentially vulnerable
functions by LEOPARD. The detailed results are reported at
our website [6]. The time used to build the code property
graph and query the graph to obtain metric values depends
on the number of functions in each project. For small-scale
projects, it respectively takes 2 and 45 minutes to build and
query the graph; and it takes hours for large-scale projects
(i.e., Wireshark and Linux). It takes less than 50 seconds
to identify 100% functions even for Linux. These results
demonstrate that our framework scales well for large-size
projects like Linux. For machine learning-based techniques,
GB on average takes 9 minutes to train the model and make the
prediction for each project, and RF takes 5 minutes. Considering
they also depend on the metrics calculation, LEOPARD is more
efficient. S*** basically takes several minutes to finish the
static analysis but requires the project to be well compiled and
built, and fail to handle Linux. The lightweight static scanner
Cppcheck shows comparable performance as LEOPARD.
Our framework scales well and can be applied to large-
scale applications like Linux.
F. Application of LEOPARD (Q5)
Manual Auditing. Code review is a popular approach for
vulnerability hunting. In this section, we demonstrate the
role that LEOPARD plays in helping security experts to hunt
vulnerabilities with a case study of FFmpeg 3.1.3. In order
not to overwhelm the security expert, we showed the top 1%
candidates with LEOPARD, which is a list of 128 functions
with detailed complexity and vulnerability metric scores, as
well as the specific variables involved in the metrics, e.g., the
variables involved in control predicates. The security expert
TABLE VII: Zero-Day Vulnerabilities in PHP
Module CVE-ID Type Reproducible?32-bit 64-bit
php::mbstring CVE-2017-9224 stack out-of-bound read 3 3
php::mbstring CVE-2017-9225 heap out-of-bound write 3 7
php::mbstring CVE-2017-9226 heap out-of-bound write 3 3
php::Zend CVE-2017-9227 stack out-of-bound read 3 3
php::mbstring CVE-2017-9228 heap out-of-bound write 3 3
php::mbstring CVE-2017-9229 invalid dereference DoS 3 3
is experienced with code review and is familiar with the
basic implementation and code structures of FFmpeg. He
firstly grouped the functions into different modules and chose
libavformat as the target, which is the module responsible for
the streaming protocols and conversion, and has been prone to
vulnerabilities in history. Among all 128 functions, 13 of them
are in libavformat. He spent one day to find a divide-by-zero
bug in one of the functions, with CVE-2018-14394 assigned.
Intuitively, he thinks the maximum of data-dependent control
structures metrics (with the variables involved) more interesting,
as he can be guided to trace backward and/or forward the data
flow of these sensitive variables. Detailed discussion about the
aforementioned case can be found at our website [6].
Directed Fuzzing. As discussed in § III, LEOPARD can supply
targets for directed fuzzing. Experimentally, we ran LEOPARD
on PHP 5.6.30 (a popular general-purpose scripting language
that is especially suited to web development) and identified
around 500 functions as potentially vulnerable. Notice that PHP
is used by more than 80% of all the websites, and 5.6.30
is the current stable version. Thus PHP is well-tested by its
users, developers, and security researchers, and it is difficult to
find vulnerabilities. We selected top 500 functions reported by
LEOPARD as the target sites for Hawkeye for bug hunting. We
divided PHP into several modules based on its architecture and
focused on the functions in the modules (e.g., mbstring and
Zend) that are related to file system and network data as they are
often reachable through entry points. We excluded the functions
in those well-fuzzed modules (e.g., SQLite, phar and gd). This
manual filtering process is different from manual auditing as
the security expert does not pinpoint the vulnerability directly.
After 6-hour fuzzing, we discovered six vulnerabilities in PHP
5.6.30 with details shown in Table VII.
Seed Prioritization. In § III, we also discussed the application
of applying the results of LEOPARD to the seed evaluation
process during fuzzing. We used LEOPARD to generate function
level scores for three real-world open-source projects and
utilized the scores to provide guidance to FOT [19]. The three
projects are mjs [1] (a Javascript engine for embedded systems),
xed [2] (the disassembler used in Intel-Pin) and radare2 [3] (a
popular open source reverse engineering framework). For the
experiment purpose, we ran FOT with and without the guidance
from LEOPARD for 24 hours and collected the detected crashes.
Table VIII shows the detailed performance differences of
FOT with and without LEOPARD. From the results, LEOPARD
can help FOT to detect 127% more crashes in 24 hours on
average. Finally, seven new bugs are found in mjs, seven new
bugs are found in xed, and a new vulnerability (CVE-2018-
14017) is exposed in radare2.
TABLE VIII: Crashes Detected in 24 Hours by FOT with and
without the Results from LEOPARD
Project w/o LEOPARD with LEOPARD
mjs 181 251
xed 720 1800
radare2 7 9
average 303 687
These results showed that LEOPARD can substantially
enhance the vulnerability finding for a limited time budget,
which is the original purpose of designing LEOPARD.
V. METRICS EXTENSION
The set of complexity and vulnerability metrics can be re-
fined and extended, to highlight interesting functions via captur-
ing different perspectives. To this end, we have identified the fol-
lowing information to be vital to further improve our findings.
Taint Information. Leveraging taint information will help an
analyst to identify the functions that process the external (i.e.,
taint) input. In general, functions that process or propagate
the taint information can be considered quite interesting for
further assessment. Hence, incorporating the taint information
into vulnerability metrics will further enhance the LEOPARD’s
ranking step by assigning more weight (or importance) to the
functions that process or propagate the taint information.
Vulnerability History. In general, when a vulnerability is re-
ported, the functions related to the vulnerability will go
through an intensive security assessment during the patching
process. Hence, such information can be used to refine the
ranking by either: (1) giving more importance to recently
patched functions due to the verified reachability, with consid-
erable risks of incomplete patch or introducing new issues, or
(2) giving low priority to the functions that are patched long
before the release of the current version, assuming that the
functions have gone through a thorough security assessment
and it is not worth the effort to re-assess it.
Domain Knowledge. Domain knowledge can play a vital role
in prioritizing the interesting functions for further assessment.
Information such as the modules that are currently fuzzed by
others or the knowledge about the modules that are shared by
two or more projects can be used to refine LEOPARD’s ranking.
VI. RELATED WORK
Here we discuss the most closely related work that aim at
assisting security experts during vulnerability assessment.
Pattern-Based Approaches. Pattern-based approaches use pat-
terns of known vulnerabilities to identify potentially vulnerable
code. Initially, code scanners (e.g., Flawfinder [5], PScan [8],
RATS [9] and ITS4 [64]) were proposed to match vulnerability
patterns. These scanners are efficient and practical, but fail to
identify complex vulnerabilities as the patterns are often coarse-
grained and straightforward. Differently, our approach does not
require any patterns or prior knowledge of vulnerabilities.
Since then, security researchers have started to leverage more
advanced static analysis techniques for pattern-based vulnera-
bility identification (e.g., [18, 29, 34, 37, 59, 63, 71, 72, 74]).
These approaches require the existence of known vulnera-
bilities or security knowledge as the guideline to formulate
patterns. As a result, they can only identify similar but not new
vulnerable code. Differently, we do not require any pattern
inputs or prior knowledge of vulnerabilities, and can find new
types of vulnerabilities.
Besides, several attempts have been made to automatically
infer vulnerability patterns (e.g., [41, 62, 73]). While promising,
these approaches only support specific types of vulnerabilities,
e.g., missing-checking vulnerabilities for [62] and taint-style
vulnerabilities for [41, 73]. However, our approach can find
new types of vulnerabilities.
Metric-Based Approaches. Inspired by bug prediction [16, 28,
30, 38, 49], a number of advances have been made in applying
machine learning to predict vulnerable code mostly at the
granularity level of a source file. In particular, researchers
started by leveraging complexity metrics [21, 44, 45, 55, 56]
to predict vulnerable files. Then, they attempted to combine
complexity metrics with more metrics such as code churn
metrics and token frequency metrics [26, 31, 43, 47, 48,
52, 54, 54, 57, 58, 58, 65, 79, 81]. Then, advances have
been made to use unsupervised machine learning to predict
bugs [25, 32, 36, 46, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80] using the similar set of
complexity metrics. These approaches use the similar metrics
as those in bug prediction, but do not capture the difference
between vulnerable code and buggy code, which hinders the
effectiveness. Moreover, the imbalance between vulnerable and
non-vulnerable code is severe, which hinders the applicability
of machine learning to vulnerable code identification. Instead,
our approach specifically derives a set of vulnerability metrics
to help identify vulnerable functions.
Vulnerability-Specific Static Analysis. Researchers have at-
tempted to detect specific types of vulnerabilities via static
analysis; e.g., buffer overflows [24, 82], format string vul-
nerabilities [24, 53], SQL injections [23, 33, 69], cross-site
scripting [23, 33, 35] and client-side validation vulnerabili-
ties [51]. While they are effective at detecting specific types of
vulnerabilities, they often fail to be applicable to a wider
range of vulnerability types. Moreover, they often require
heavyweight program analysis techniques. Differently, our
approach is designed to be generic and lightweight.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed and implemented a generic, lightweight
and extensible framework, named LEOPARD, to identify
potential vulnerable code at the function level through two sets
of systematically derived program metrics. Experimental results
on 11 real-world projects have demonstrated the effectiveness,
scalability and applications of LEOPARD.
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